APBSCPublication boundary & security closure 中文

APBSC 09 · Algorithm · closes Phase I

The researcher-blind publication-boundary measurement algorithm

The series' requirements turned into a pipeline a machine can run while the researcher stays blind.

2026-09-21 · v0.1 · Internal research draft v0.1 · full text not yet public

maximize research utility subject to raw exposure ≤ τ

The argument

A public repository's current state X passes through normalization, a detector ensemble, sensitive-value suppression, feature extraction and adjudication to a research-safe output: X → N → D → S → F → A → O. Seven detectors cover paths, secret-like material, networks, authentication, semantics, metadata and recoverability, and each declares its scope.

Everything that touches the data sits inside the threat model — detectors, sanitizers, logs, feature generators, debug output and the disclosure module. The algorithm forbids repository identity in the analysis layer; raw paths and endpoints in the dataset; credential validation; quotable source text; raw exception logs; group labels before classification is locked; and turning UNKNOWN, or a single detector's PASS, into a privacy verdict.

It is a bounded, auditable, machine-first measurement architecture — not a perfect anonymizer and not a formal proof of semantic privacy. Its implementation is the RBPM runtime whose versions and results are on the evidence page.

Key ideas

  • State machine: discovered → eligible → acquired → normalized → detected → sanitized → featured → adjudicated → sealed → analysis-ready.
  • Side states: excluded, UNKNOWN, escalation required, responsible disclosure, pipeline failure.
  • The verifier is part of the verification surface.

Propositions it carries

  • OObserved

    Real public files can be reduced to bounded research features without exporting any repository identity or source text.

    RBPM v0.6 – v0.8.3

What it does not claim

  • Perfect anonymization.
  • A formal proof of semantic privacy.